UNMOVIC weapons inspectors’ latest report to the Security Council criticizes the U.S. Government for obstructing their work, but its quality was confirmed by the U.S. Weapons inspectors’ futile search
The Bush administration had already criticized at the very beginning of the resumed UN inspections in Iraq before the war that the inspectors did not proceed decisively enough and that the Hussein regime was also a master in bartering. The UN was accused of incompetence, and the well-known, well-trodden stories were presented in contradiction to the reports of the UN inspectors "Facts" of their own intelligence services to prove that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and provided the reason to end UN weapons inspections and start the war.
With great effort, the occupying forces allegedly loved to search Iraq with their own teams for weapons of mass destruction or at least for signs of the existence of corresponding programs. Again and again there were finds, which turned out to be misinterpretations afterwards. Finally, in January, U.S. Chief Weapons Inspector David Kay not only resigned after months of searching, but also said that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction at the start of the war and presumably had not pursued any major weapons programs since the early 1990s (And yet they do exist!).
But in order to cover the Bush administration, he blamed the intelligence services for the false information, relying too much on satellites, intercepted communications, defectors or foreign intelligence services – and also on the information obtained by exiled Iraqis, it could be added. Hussein had lived in a kind of dream world since the mid-1990s, thinking that funds continued to flow into weapons development, but that he had been traded in the process by corrupt collaborators.
The U.S. Weapons inspectors have thus reached the level that, for example, former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter had already communicated clearly enough at the beginning of the American war campaign. The UN chief inspector Hans Blix also had the "Information" was always viewed critically by the British and the Americans and was therefore not only rebuffed, but also put under massive pressure and defamed from the very beginning. At the end of February he told Stern, without having to take diplomatic considerations into account, that all weapons of mass destruction had presumably already been destroyed in 1991 after the war:
"They would not listen. I will give you an example: Our inspectors had a fixed language rule. If something was missing,.Then that was official: "still to be proven." But Americans and British read in these places hard-naked: "Is present." So they created facts where there were no facts at all. My warnings were ignored. … The USA needed weapons of mass destruction to wage war. So they made up a reality. They had to sell the war. That was scandalously reckless.
To make the barrel full, the latest quarterly report of UNMOVIC to the Security Council has now also been published. It is the 16. Report submitted under Resolution 1284 of 1999. Without further comment, David Kay is quoted as having told the U.S. Congress on 28. January, had said it was unlikely in Iraq, at least after 1994, that there would still be "larger stockpiles" of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq after 1994. The report, which also addresses outstanding questions, draws on information gathered by U.N. Weapons inspectors in the years leading up to the start of the war in 2003, as well as information that came after the war from, for example, David Kay or other publicly available sources. The authors of the report, however, criticize the U.S. For not having received the report of David Kay, nor ever having asked for information from the UN weapons inspectors for its search. However, one hopes for a better cooperation with Charles Duelfer, the new head of the Iraq Survey Group.
For a lot of people who were negative because they didn’t know, the impact from David Kay’s pronouncement has started them to realize that there was expertise in UNMOVIC, that we were not incompetent. The results were the same.
Demetrius Perricos, Head of UNMOVIC
The report points out that the U.S. Weapons inspectors’ futile search, which was no longer obstructed by the Hussein regime, only confirmed the UN weapons inspectors’ findings made between November 2002 and March 2003. More than the findings presented in February 2003 (UN’s finest hour) could not be done after the war, despite much more time, more staff and more resources.
The report calls on the Security Council to discuss the future of UNMOVIC as soon as possible, before the experts – at the moment still a total of 51 weapons experts and other staff – start looking for other jobs: "Trained and experienced experts are difficult to assemble in the short term once they are dispersed." This also involves the network of laboratories with which UNMOVIC collaborates to conduct chemical or biological analyses. It is hoped that cooperation with Duelfer will not only enable the Iraq report to be completed with the latest findings, but also to provide a model for future weapons inspections along the lines of "lessons learned" to be able to present. In fact, if the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is to be prevented, the world community will have to deal with this issue even more often.
For example, a compendium on Iraq "Compendium" The book shows how Iraq was able to acquire and produce weapons of mass destruction step by step between 1973 and 1991 and to build up a network of companies for this purpose:
While Iraq followed the same general routes and experience as other States, it did adopt some unique methods and activities. Iraq’s programs reveal elements which it is essential to understand if wider non-proliferation efforts are to be strengthened.