Bild Breitscheidplatz: Andreas Trojak / CC-BY-2.0
Police investigate and mix up at Berlin attack site in March 2019 while denying – investigative committees know nothing
More than two years after the Christmas market attack, there are still investigations at the crime scene, of which no one but the police knows?
On 12. March 2019, a burger in Berlin made observations that suggest that. On a bus, he drove past Breitscheidplatz, where on 19. December 2016 the deadly attack with a semitrailer was verubt. The police had closed off the access roads, only public buses were allowed to pass through. There were about 15 to 20 police officers in the square, especially in the two places where the truck had entered the market and where it had come to a halt.
In the perception of the burger, the police conducted "extensive blending work" through. He saw officers with measuring sticks. The entrance area as well as the traffic island there had been measured. The position of the truck was marked with monochrome markers.
The witness, who shared his observations with the Telepolis editorial team, remembers that it was almost exactly 10:40 a.M. When he passed Breitscheidplatz. On the return journey at about 12 o’clock the streets were free again and no police were present.
A striking scenario, to which one could expect plausible official statements. But this is not so. The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), which is investigating the Breitscheidplatz attack on behalf of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (BAW), denies that there is any current evidence of the attack "any mixing" made or "Crime scene investigations" to have carried out. The BAW in Karlsruhe wants to "in principle" to make any statements about the attack, i.E. To neither confirm "neither confirm nor deny", that it has anything to do with the police investigation and that it may have been a crime scene investigation. This attitude is new, because a few weeks ago the authorities answered questions about the attack.
Remains the Berlin police. In fact, they confirm that on that day 12. Marz officers were on duty at Breitscheidplatz and made markings and mingling. However, this had nothing to do with the attack. It had to do with "with traffic accident sketches, as they are" as they were carried out every week somewhere. Drones were then brought up and the accident sketches were photographed. The department of forensics of the LKA is responsible for it. The fact that these exercises took place in the very place where the truck entered the square and where it came to a stop is not to be underestimated "Coincidence", according to a spokeswoman for the Police Prasidium.
Hard to believe after all the manipulations and cover-up attempts within the Berlin LKA in the Amri complex, but also with other security agencies, as one must experience week after week in the parliamentary investigation committees.
But what is to be covered up, if it was a crime scene investigation after all?? Were these mixtures possibly connected with the latest publications about videos of the crime scene, taken from the roof of a high-rise building??
What do the videos of the crime show?
In March 2018, the ARD magazine Kontraste had aired a few-second video sequence showing the truck speeding into the square, ending when it came to a stop. The video was recorded by a camera at the Europacenter on Breitscheidplatz. In addition, a second sequence was circulated, in which one can still see the driver getting out of the car. Since then, the question arose how long the original footage is, what can be seen on it and who owns it?
At the end of February 2019, Focus magazine reported that there was a "film that had been kept under lock and key", that not only shows the driver getting out of the car and "go its own way", but also that a second person hit a man "to the head of a man with a square timber", to clear the way for the escaping man.
It was only now that it was learned that the Kontraste editorial staff also had a longer recording available, but that they "not to be expected from the public" wanted, because one "violent things" on it. What kind of "violent things" The journalists have not yet told the public what it is about.
Even among those affected and eyewitnesses of the attack, there are voices that want to see the video. Finally they had the "violent things" witnessed at that time itself, dead and wounded. A video could not shock them anymore. In the meantime, it is known that the recordings made from the Europacenter and available to the BKA are in total about eleven minutes long. In addition, there is at least a second video, which was shot by a guest from a hotel on Breitscheidplatz.
The authenticity of the video of the Europacenter is repeatedly called into question, especially by attack deniers, most of whom are anonymous on the Internet.
Were the mix-ups at Breitscheidplatz perhaps related to authenticity calls of the video?
The Amri investigation committee in the Bundestag has since received a catch of the crime video. But it is said to be only the second shortest version, on which you can still see the driver getting out, not even the catch that Kontraste has, let alone the eleven minute long one.
And also from current mixtures and crime scene investigations one knows neither in the Amri committee of the Bundestag nor that of Berlin something.
In the House of Representatives, during the most recent session, it was again necessary to argue that witnesses should be heard in public as a matter of principle. First the committee discussed internally for three quarters of an hour whether there should be an open part at all. From the State Criminal Police Office (LKA) two commissioners were summoned as witnesses, who wanted to make a rough part of their statements only behind closed doors. One of them is responsible for the V-persons (VP), i.E. Informers, who are used in the field of organized crime (OC). The other is the same for the State Security, which pursues politically motivated crime, including radical Islamism.
The two areas are of interest because they overlap and because Anis Amri, the alleged perpetrator of the Breitscheidplatz attack, moved in both milieus. He was a drug dealer and visited radical mosques. In both areas, there are also supposed to have been informers in Amri’s environment, at least three, as the head of the LKA has confirmed. In addition, Berlin’s Verfangsschutz had at least one informer who moved in Amri’s environment.
In the public part of the meeting, the two criminal investigators only gave general information, such as that takeovers and informer controls take place, for example, when a target goes to a mosque (Islamism area) after his drug dealings (OK area) or vice versa. Whenever it threatened to become more concrete or systematic, the witnesses referred to the following non-public part of the meeting.
Since when have V-persons (VPs) been used in the field of Islamism? How are V-persons recruited?
How is the order to deploy a V-person implemented??
What was done after visual material on Amri was provided in February 2016??
Where are the findings on the Islamist spectrum brought together??
What overlaps existed between organized crime and Islamism in the Amri case??
If there are overlaps, do the sources also change areas??
Does a VP assignment also include the observation of dangerous persons?? Are there informants who are involved in OC or Islamism??
Are there V-persons in prisons??
In what form do you cooperate with the intelligence services?? What information played a role in the proceedings to ban the Fussilet mosque??
What orders were there for sources after the attack??
Due to the focus on Islamist extremism, are there no longer any undercover agents in the areas of left-wing and right-wing extremism??
For all these questions, the answers can only be given in private. These sessions lasted longer than the public ones. At least the questions mark the terrain in which Amri and his accomplices moved.
Use of undercover agents
The use of undercover agents in Berlin must be ordered by the police president. This is a consequence of the attack and is based on a decree of the secretary of state in the interior administration. This means: The decision-making authority was raised by three hierarchical levels. Before the attack, department heads held this authority. Can one conclude from this that something must have been wrong with the VP system??
How is defined "Environment"? Since the Federal Office for the Protection of Interception (BfV), which had an undercover agent in the Berlin Fussilet mosque, has denied that this mosque, where Amri went in and out, was part of the "Environment" In the committees, the deputies keep asking this question to the various witnesses, in order to pay for the possible assassination. The answer of the LKA officer from the OC area was clear: If a target regularly visits a cafe, maintains contact with people there and knows the landlord, this cafe can be counted as part of his or her environment. He thus contradicts the account of the BfV.
Both LKA officials stated that they had heard the name Anis Amri only after the attack. However, the state protector had to admit that his department knew the name Amri very well from February 2016 at the latest. The OC investigator was not sure whether he was the only one who did not know the name, but other colleagues may have known it. Gray areas that offer room for different interpretations.
How different and contradictory the conclusions can be, was shown in the press round with the spokesmen of the parties. For Stephan Standfub (CDU) and Frank Zimmermann (SPD), who did not ask a single question in the public rounds, it has been confirmed that the LKA’s undercover officers did not have anything to do with Amri before the attack, but only recognized him afterwards from pictures. A rather liberal interpretation, because a recognition presupposes that one has known someone. Moreover, it contradicts the statements of the head of the LKA, who said that he had three sources "in Amri’s environment" . For Niklas Schrader (Left Party), on the other hand, much of Amri’s environment is still in the dark. Both what sources and informants knew about Amri himself, as well as what they knew about his contacts. The reason, according to the deputy, is that the committee has not yet received any files on the informants. This makes the investigation difficult.
Release of files disputed
However, the Berlin Amri committee is being deprived of files by other parties as well. We learn that the Federal Ministry of the Interior has refused to provide documents because the committee, as an institution of a federal state, is not authorized to do so. This mainly concerns files of the BKA, but also of the Federal Prosecutor General (GBA), for which the Federal Ministry of Justice is responsible. GBA and BKA are the investigating authorities in the Breitscheidplatz attack case. Without their files, however, the committee cannot investigate the attack. This is an interference with the powers of a parliament. Organs of the executive put themselves above organs of the legislative on their own authority.
The game is well known, but legally questionable, in part because the 2016 terrorist attack was an event of paramount public interest. In July 2017, the head of the terrorism department of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office appeared in the Interior Committee of the Berlin House of Representatives and answered questions from the deputies. The invitation, Thomas Beck said at the time, was an honor for him personally and for his office "an honor". Not much of that seems to have remained.
This is why the Seehofer Ministry’s justification for refusing to provide the files appears to be pretextual. The ministry also withheld evidence from the Bundestag committee, which should have had the authority to do so: Witnesses, such as undercover agents of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) or even undercover agents of the BfV.
The three small parliamentary groups, the FDP, the Bundnisgrune and the Linke, have filed a complaint against this with the Federal Constitutional Court. It is the second. The Federal Court of Justice has now ruled on the first complaint and ruled in favor of the three small factions. The question is whether the committee can request that the German government provide the files of the Federal Office for Information Security (BfV) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in the Amri case, which the Parliamentary Control Committee of the Bundestag also received in January 2017. This is controversial within the committee. The two coarser factions, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which carry the government, were of the opinion that such an evidentiary decision was inadmissible because it violated secrecy.
The BGH now sees things differently and has made an astonishing decision: The evidence order was not only admissible, but the investigative committee on the Breitscheidplatz terrorist attack was virtually obliged to obtain the named files from the federal government. However, he did not order the collection of evidence himself, according to the 3. Criminal Senate in Karlsruhe, because he assumes that the committee will follow the law and will obey the decision of the Senate. In other words: that it decides to demand the documents.
Whether the committee will receive the files in their entirety, however, remains questionable, because the BGH ruling contains another ambiguous component. At the same time, it guarantees the government the right to, "not to hand over individual documents that are subject to secrecy". Thus the court relativizes its own judgment.